







What is the Essence of an Essence?
Comparing Afro-Relational and Western-Individualist Ontologies
Abstract
The dominant view amongst contemporary Western philosophers about the essence of a natu­
ral object is that it is constituted by its intrinsic properties. The ontological approach salient 
in the African philosophical tradition, in contrast, accounts for a thing’s essence by appeal to 
its relational properties. The Afro­relational ontology is under­developed, with the primary 
aim of this article being to help rectify that weakness. Specifically, this article’s aims are: to 
articulate an African approach to understanding the essence of a concrete, natural thing in 
terms of its relationships; to illustrate the Afro­relational approach with the examples of the 
self and of water; to contrast the Afro­relational characterization of the essence of the self 
and of water with a typically Western construal in terms of their intrinsic properties; and 
finally to provide an initial defence of the Afro­relational approach, both by responding to 



































and	of	water,	 to	contrast	 these	examples	with	a	 typically	Anglo-American,	
and	more	generally	Western	approach	to	them	in	terms	of	their	intrinsic	prop-
erties	and,	finally,	to	provide	some	defence	of	the	Afro-relational	approach,	
both	 by	 responding	 to	 objections	 facing	 it	 and	 by	 providing	 new,	 positive	
reasons	to	take	it	seriously.






Furthermore,	 this	 article	 addresses	 only	 one	metaphysical	 view	 commonly	
espoused	by	African	philosophers,	 regarding	 the	respect	 in	which	a	 thing’s	
nature	is	necessarily	constituted	by	its	relational	properties,	and	it	sets	aside	
other	views.	Thus,	for	example,	it	does	not	consider	the	claims	that	reality	is	
an	 interdependent	whole,	 that	 it	 is	ultimately	composed	of	 forces,	and	 that	



















2. Definitions of Key Terms
This	point	of	this	section	is	to	clarify	the	central	terms	of	the	hypothesis	that	
the	 essence	 of	 a	 natural	 object	 is	 not	 exhausted	 by	 its	 intrinsic	 properties,	


















lational”	without	 controversy;	 the	 literature	 is	 contested	 and	 intricate,	 and	






Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy	entry	on	the	intrinsic/extrinsic	distinc-































artefacts,	 and	 specifically	 natural	 objects,	 a	
relational	 approach	 towards	 which	 is	 prima	
facie	 more	 difficult	 to	 establish,	 in	 the	 ab-



































































Thus,	 when	 calling	 relational	 accounts	 of	 natural	 essences	 “African”,	 the	
claim	is	 that	 they	are	salient	 in	philosophies	 that	have	been	expounded	for	








3. An Afro-Relational Hypothesis 
   about the Essence of an Essence
This	section	begins	with	some	quotations	from	African	metaphysicians	about	
how	 they	understand	 the	 fundamental	 nature	 of	 reality,	 sometimes	 specifi-
cally	the	nature	of	the	self.	They	do	not	always	focus	exclusively	on	the	no-

























not	 only	 relational	 properties	 but	 also,	 say,	
symbolic	ones,	on	which	see	Bradley	(1998).
4
For	 a	more	 thorough	 exposition,	 as	 well	 as	
some	defence,	see	Metz	(2015).
5
For	 similar	 claims,	 see	Tempels	 (1959:	 esp.	
103,	 108);	 Shutte	 (2001:	 22–23);	 Nasseem	








































essence of any concrete, natural object is, at least in part, necessarily consti­





























approach	 to	ontology,	 it	 is	worth	pointing	out	how	 it	differs	 from	one	of	
the	better	known	relational	approaches	advanced	by	a	Western	philosopher,	
namely,	Richard	Rorty’s	(1999)	view.	Rorty	famously	rejects	the	existence	
























latter	 is	 a	 Nigerian	 epistemologist	 who	 pu-




had	 relocated	 to	 southern	Africa	 and	 taught	
at	 the	National	University	of	Lesotho	 in	 the	
1970s.	They	co-authored	African Philosophy: 
An Introduction to the Main Philosophical 







When	giving	 a	 talk	based	on	 this	 essay,	 the	
author	happened	 to	meet	a	Western	philoso-
pher	who	 has	 advanced	 a	 view,	 particularly	
of	 the	 identity	of	 the	self,	 similar	 to	what	 is	
called	“African”	here,	namely,	Michael	Los-
onsky	(1987a,	1987b).	However,	Losonsky’s	



















































elsewhere.	However,	 it	will	 note	 that	 the	Contemporary	Version	 in	 its	 de-
scriptive	guise	is	probably	the	least	plausible	of	the	six	options	distinguished	
above.	The	Contemporary	Version	does	have	some	 things	going	for	 it.	For	










































Origination	 and	Historical	Versions	 in	 what	 follows.	 If	 arguments	 can	 be	









to	 understand	 personal	 identity	 in	 relational	
terms,	 on	 which	 see	 the	 philosopher	 Roger	




















brain	 theory	 of	 personal	 identity	 is	 one	 intrinsic	 account	 of	 how	 it	would	





















4.2. A Relational Account of Water



























Of	 course,	 Putnam	 (1975:	 223–235;	 cf.	 1990:	 59)	 and	Kripke	 (1980:	 124,	
128)	 have	 a	 famously	 opposing	 intuition.	 They	would	 contend	 that,	 upon	































5. Defending the Afro-Relational 





























alone.	We	 usually	 identify	 relations	 in	 terms	 of	 their	 relata,	which,	 so	 the	








As	an	 initial	 reply,	 consider	 that	 identifying	a	 relationship	by	appeal	 to	 its	
relata	is	not	particularly	weighty	evidence	that	the	latter	is	utterly	metaphysi-
cally	 independent	of	 the	 former.	One	might	specify	a	dollar	bill,	my	hand,	
a	widget	and	another	person’s	hand	 to	 identify	a	 financial	exchange,	but	 it	










A	 third	 objection	 is	 that	 explanatory	 fundamentality	 tracks	 intrinsic	meta-






























































partment	 of	 Philosophy,	 and	 participants	 at	
the	Conference	on	Contemporary	Language,	
Logic	and	Metaphysics:	African	and	Western	
Approaches	 organised	 by	 the	 University	 of	
Witwatersrand’s	 Department	 of	 Philosophy.	
This	article	has	also	been	improved	as	a	result	
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Thaddeus Metz
Što je bit neke biti?
Uspoređivanje afro-relacijskih i zapadno-individualističkih ontologija
Sažetak
Prevladavajući pogled među suvremenim filozofima Zapada po pitanju bȋti jest da je utemeljuju 
intrinzična svojstva. Suprotno, istaknuti ontološki pristup u afričkoj filozofskoj tradiciji utvrđuje 
bit stvari prema njenim relacijskim svojstvima. Afro­relacijska ontologija je nedovoljno razvije­
na, stoga je prvi cilj članka pomoći u njenom razvoju. Specifično, ciljevi su rada sljedeći: arti­
kulirati afrički pristup razumijevanju bȋti konkretne, prirodne stvari u pogledu njenih relacija; 
ilustrirati afro­relacijski pristup primjerima sebstva i vode; kontrastirati afro­relacijsku karak­
terizaciju bȋti sebstva i vode s tipičnim zapadnim konstruktima u pogledu intrinzičnih svojstava; 
te konačno ponuditi inicijalnu obranu afro­relacijskog pristupa podjednako odgovarajući na 
postojeće prigovore i pridodajući nove, pozitivne razloge da se ozbiljno uzme u obzir.
Ključne riječi
afrička	metafizika,	 bit,	 intrinzična	 svojstva,	 narav,	 ontologija,	 osobni	 identitet,	 relacijska	 svojstva,	
sebstvo,	voda
Thaddeus Metz
Was ist das Wesen eines Wesens?
Vergleich der afro-relationalen und westlich-individualistischen Ontologien
Zusammenfassung
Der überwiegende Blickwinkel unter den zeitgenössischen westlichen Philosophen bezüglich 
der Frage des Wesens ist die Tatsache, dass es auf inhärenten Eigenschaften beruht. Im Ge­
genteil dazu legt der ausgeprägte ontologische Ansatz in der afrikanischen philosophischen 
Tradition das Wesen eines Dings nach dessen Relationseigenschaften fest. Die afro­relationale 
Ontologie ist nicht ausreichend entwickelt, daher ist das erste Ziel des Artikels, deren Entwick­
lung anzutreiben. Spezifisch bestehen die Ziele der Arbeit darin, den afrikanischen Verstehens­
ansatz zum Wesen des konkreten, natürlichen Dings bezüglich seiner Relationen zu artikulieren; 
den afro­relationalen Ansatz an Beispielen von Selbst und Wasser zu veranschaulichen; die 




Konstrukten hinsichtlich der intrinsischen Eigenschaften zu kontrastieren und schließlich die 
initiale Verteidigung des afro­relationalen Ansatzes zu unterbreiten, indem man gleichermaßen 
auf existierende Einwände reagiert und neue, positive Gründe hinzufügt, um das Bedeutsame 





Quelle est l’essence d’une certaine essence ?
Une comparaison des ontologies africaines relationalistes et 
occidentales individualistes
Résumé
L’idée prédominante parmi les philosophes contemporains occidentaux sur la question de l’es­
sence est de lui attribuer des propriétés intrinsèques. Au contraire, le fait de souligner l’appro­
che ontologique dans la tradition philosophique africaine permet d’interroger l’essence de la 
chose par rapport à ses propriétés relationnelles. L’ontologie africaine relationaliste n’étant 
pas suffisamment développée, le but premier de cet article est de l’aider dans son développe­
ment. De manière spécifique, les objectifs de ce travail sont les suivants : formuler l’approche 
africaine qui vise la compréhension de l’essence concrète, naturelle d’une chose par rapport 
à ses relations ; illustrer l’approche africaine relationaliste par le biais d’exemples qui por­
tent sur le soi et l’eau ; nuancer la caractérisation africaine relationaliste de l’essence de soi 
et de l’eau en se servant de constructions typiquement occidentales eu égard aux propriétés 
intrinsèques ; enfin, présenter la défense initiale de l’approche africaine relationaliste tout en 
répondant aux critiques existantes et en amenant de nouvelles et positives raisons pour qu’elle 
soit sérieusement prise en considération.
Mots-clés
métaphysique	africaine,	essence,	propriétés	intrinsèques,	nature,	ontologie,	identité	personnelle,	pro-
priétés	relationnelles,	le	soi,	eau
